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Consider, in particular, his suggestion that we might select our situations in order to improve our character. Here, he approvingly cites John
Doris’s famous example of being invited to a secluded dinner party with
a flirtatious colleague while one’s spouse is away. Obviously, going to the
dinner and trusting your virtue to rescue you from cheating is not the smart
thing to do; the smart thing is to decline the invitation (Lack of Character
[Cambridge University Press, 2002], 147). Miller agrees. And, of course, so
should we. Avoiding the dinner may well help us avoid acting badly.
But Miller is making the further claim—a claim for which Doris himself
was not arguing—that avoiding the dinner may also help us to become
better people. And it is not obvious to me how that is supposed to work.
The alcoholic who avoids bars is surely wise; he is almost just as surely still
an alcoholic. Merely avoiding the “near occasion of sin” hasn’t cured him
of the desire to drink alcohol. Likewise, the partnered person who avoids
candlelit dinners with colleagues is surely wise; but she is not thereby
made a more virtuous person—at least not if virtue is a disposition of the
heart, as Miller thinks that it is. Perhaps the hope is that simply avoiding
adultery eventually makes it less attractive. But it isn’t as if avoiding forbidden fruit always makes the fruit less attractive. Quite to the contrary.
So I think we need to hear more about how this strategy would work.
Of course, none of the three questions I have raised are intended as
decisive objections to Miller’s project; they are instead invitations to further elaboration. It is a mark of a good book to raise more questions than
it can itself answer. And this is a very good book indeed. A final note on
audience: while this book is not written for professional philosophers
or psychologists, it would nonetheless be appropriate for use in certain
academic contexts. My own university, for example, has recently begun
offering interdisciplinary seminars to first year students with the aim of
exemplifying how the methodologies typical of empirical science and ethical thought, for example, can fruitfully interact. The Character Gap could
serve as an ideal text for such a course.

God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, by
Mark C. Murphy. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 224. $70.00 (hardcover).
KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN, Northwestern University
In God’s Own Ethics, Mark Murphy argues that traditional formulations of
the problem of evil rely on unwarranted presumptions about the ethics of
the God whose existence they purport to disprove. The argument has two
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major parts. The first aims to establish the ethics of a perfect being as such:
which considerations would a perfect being necessarily treat as reasons for
action? After developing and defending an answer, Murphy argues that
the evils that we observe provide no significant evidence against the existence of such a being. The second part aims to establish the more ambitious conclusion that these evils also fail to provide evidence against the
existence of a perfect being worthy of our worship and allegiance, and so
the God to whom the Abrahamic religions attest.
Murphy’s argument, exemplary in clarity and attention to detail, centers on the relationships among the concept of a perfect being—which
Murphy calls the Anselmian Being—the demands of what he calls familiar
welfare-oriented goodness, and the evils that we observe. Along the intricate
and tightly woven course of the book, Murphy also touches on other important themes, including the proper methodology for reasoning about
God’s perfection, the relationships among love, practical reasons, and morality, and the conditions for rational allegiance.
In Part I, Murphy advances three claims about the ethics of the Anselmian Being: The Anselmian Being would not necessarily be motivated
by familiar welfare-oriented goodness, but would necessarily refrain from
intending setbacks to rational creatures’ welfare, and would take that
welfare to provide justifying, though not requiring, reasons to advance it.
Familiar welfare-oriented goodness is a normative ethical view that takes
the welfare of rational creatures to be among the values to which a morally
good agent responds. And it demands a certain kind of response, namely
treating setbacks to well-being as to-be-prevented. The morally good
agent fails to prevent such setbacks only when she has good reason to do
so. Standard formulations of the problem of evil presume this conception
of moral goodness when they argue that a perfect being would not allow
the sorts of suffering that are manifestly part of our world. But Murphy
argues that perfection does not entail this regard for welfare, but only the
more limited responses articulated in the second and third theses.
He begins by arguing that the Anselmian Being is not necessarily loving
in any sense that outstrips what is needed to count as perfectly morally
good. Like familiar welfare-oriented goodness, love responds to the welfare of its object. But any rationally necessitated response to this value is
already included in moral goodness. The Anselmian Being acts necessarily
only on necessary reasons. So the perfection of being loving can add nothing to the necessary ethics of the Anselmian Being, beyond whatever ethics
moral goodness entails.
Next, Murphy turns to the more ambitious thesis that the Anselmian
Being is not necessarily morally good in the familiar welfare-oriented
sense. Establishing the authority of that normative view requires a move
from X is good (bad) for some A to X provides reasons for anyone to promote
(prevent) X. But all plausible attempts to defend the move in the case
where X is the welfare of some creature and “anyone” ranges over human
beings appeal to features of human beings that the Anselmian Being does
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not necessarily share. So these arguments provide no reason to believe
that the Anselmian Being has these reasons.
Nevertheless, Murphy affirms that the Anselmian Being is perfectly
good and responsive to well-being at a higher level of abstraction. The
Anselmian Being’s perfection entails that it must be the source of the value
of all other valuable things. So creatures can be valuable only extrinsically,
in virtue of our relationship to the Anselmian Being. This, he argues, affects the kind of reasons that our value can give the Anselmian Being. Just
as the Anselmian Being has discretion about whether to create beings who
have a good, so it has discretion about whether to add an extra measure of
well-being to our lives. The Anselmian Being needs no reason not to do so,
but the value of the beings and of their welfare provides justifying reasons
on which the Anselmian Being could choose to act.
Moreover, the Anselmian Being has decisive, requiring reasons not to
intend setbacks to well-being. Such setbacks are an evil. The Anselmian
Being would not intend evil as an end; if such a being could intend evil
at all, it would only be as a means to some good. But, without justifying
reasons, making the achievement of evil the success condition of one’s act
makes that act worse than it would otherwise be. Moreover, there could be
no such reasons, because no good that could be so realized could justify the
marring of the Aneslemian Being’s agency through the intending of evil.
So the Anselmian Being has decisive requiring reasons not to intend evil.
While the Anselmian Being thus never aims to set back creaturely wellbeing, neither does it necessarily aim to advance or to prevent setbacks to
it. We have no reason to suppose that the existence of such a being would
entail or predict a world with fewer or different evils than we observe. So
the argument from evil fails to undermine the thesis that a perfect being
exists.
In the second half of the book, Murphy turns to the worry that the
conclusions of Part I amount to cold comfort for adherents of the Abrahamic traditions. For, one might think, there is a yawning gap between
the Anselmian Being imagined here and the loving God revealed in the
scriptures. Even if the argument from evil fails to establish that no perfect
being exists, it may yet succeed in establishing that observed suffering
provides good reason to think that there is no God worthy of our worship
and allegiance.
Murphy dispenses quickly with worries about worship-worthiness,
claiming that this feature follows from the Anselmian Being’s perfection.
He takes more seriously the challenge that suffering poses to the possibility that God is worthy of allegiance. As he puts it, the worry is that
“What precludes the argument from evil from getting purchase against
the Anselmian Being—that the Anselmian Being’s ethics is not necessarily
the ethics of rational creatures—also precludes the Anselmian Being from
being necessarily worthy of allegiance” (147).
To deserve allegiance, Murphy holds, God must have an ethics
sufficiently like our own. That is, God must treat as reasons certain
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considerations that we treat as reasons. Part I has shown that God will not
necessarily do so just in virtue of being perfect. But a perfect being could
choose to take on these reasons contingently. Murphy contends that the
Abrahamic scriptures and traditions attest to a God who has done just
that. Human beings can choose to take on commitments that change the
normative status of certain considerations, rendering them reasons. God
shares this normative power. Like us, God may take on reasons by adopting discretionary ends or—most significantly, given the scriptural narratives—making promises or covenants with creatures.
But to turn back the problem of evil, Murphy must go further, establishing that God’s chosen ethics can make God worthy of our allegiance,
while yet remaining consistent with the evils that we observe. If, for example, only a being motivated by familiar welfare-oriented goodness
could be worthy of allegiance, then the original version of the argument
from evil returns. But Murphy denies the antecedent. He holds that familiar welfare-oriented goodness governs human beings, and also that in
order to be worthy of our allegiance God needs to share in our reasons
to a sufficient extent. But God need not have exactly the same ethics as
human creatures to be worthy of allegiance. Instead, he argues, we would
have reason to ally ourselves with and subordinate our wills to God if: (1)
God will never direct us to act in ways that come into conflict with our
first-order obligations, including those given by familiar welfare-oriented
goodness, and (2) We would do better in securing our reasonable ends by
subordinating our wills than by acting on our own judgment or in some
other way. Murphy offers three models of this possibility, each a possible
political authority that, he claims, we would have reason to empower and
accept. The models make clear that God could make and keep promises
that the two conditions will be met, without being motivated to maximize
the welfare of creatures. So the existence of evils that God could have prevented provides no evidence against God’s allegiance-worthiness.
Murphy concludes by arguing that the scriptures represent God as
making the relevant sort of covenants with us, promising us great goods—
and in particular that all will be well for us in the end—if we subordinate
our wills to God’s will. But they do not represent God as taking on familiar
welfare-oriented goodness. The book ends with an argument that Murphy’s account of God’s ethics makes better sense than any of its competitors can of the central Christian doctrine that God loves us even though
God doesn’t have to.
In at least one important way I make an unhelpfully sympathetic audience for Murphy’s claims about God’s ethics. No doubt some will resist
his argument on the grounds that God couldn’t depart so far from the
moral ideals that govern us, yet still count as perfectly good. Such readers
might seek an account that makes God more beholden to look out for our
well-being. But I have doubts about the extent to which we bear this sort
of responsibility even to one another. Murphy treats it as uncontroversial
that familiar welfare-oriented goodness governs human beings. If correct,
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this makes his claims that the Anselmian Being is not necessarily morally good in this sense, and that God need not be even contingently so,
more interesting. But, while I find these conclusions about God’s ethics
plausible, I take them to be insights into the right way to understand moral
goodness, rather than revealing the distance between our ethics and God’s.
Murphy may not like this characterization, but I find it helpful to understand him as suggesting that God is less consequentialist than we
might have thought, and instead more like a Kantian. God needn’t look to
maximize creaturely well-being, nor even take the advancement of wellbeing as a reason to act, at each possible moment. As I would put it, God
need not take responsibility for our well-being in the way that consequentialism requires. Instead, the ethics that Murphy ascribes to God combines
a certain requirement of respect, the limiting condition of not aiming to
set back well-being, with something much like the Kantian wide duty to
advance the happiness of others, regarding advancement of human flourishing as providing justifying reasons. The further thought that God may
choose to convert some justifying reasons to requiring reasons by making
promises also fits comfortably within a Kantian scheme. So if Kantian
normative ethics is close to the truth about the reasons governing human
beings, the gulf between God’s ethics and ours is plausibly much narrower
than Murphy suggests.
Murphy’s general conception of moral goodness, appropriate responsiveness to value (23), is initially neutral with respect to both which values
and which responses are in question. He then specifies the notion, holding that creaturely welfare must be among the relevant values, and that,
at least for human beings, the required responses are those comprising
familiar welfare-oriented goodness. But Murphy offers little defense of
these specifications, and one might doubt that goodness requires treating
the welfare of human or sentient beings as valuable, at least as intrinsically
so. One might, for example, hold that the value of the beings themselves,
not that of their welfare, immediately guides morally good responses. In
a slightly later formulation (29), Murphy adds persons to the values response to which is included in moral goodness. But a stretch of argument
is required to move from the idea of valuing a person to valuing her welfare. I have elsewhere argued against this way of thinking of our reasons,
not just with respect to other persons generally, but even concerning those
we love (Kyla Ebels-Duggan, “Against Benificence: A Normative Account
of Love,” Ethics 119 [2008]: 142–170).
Murphy drives the wedge between his conceptions of human and divine goodness in chapter 3, where he argues for the apparently shocking
thesis that the Anselmian Being is not necessarily morally good. But his
argument might be taken to cast doubt on the claim that familiar welfareoriented goodness is the best conception of moral goodness, rather than
supporting his narrower stated thesis that this conception doesn’t apply to
the Anselmian Being. How shocking the thesis of chapter 3, and so of the
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book as a whole, is depends on how satisfactory this “familiar” conception of moral goodness turns out to be.
I concur with Murphy’s claim that the move from X is good (bad) for A
to there is a reason for anyone to promote (prevent) X needs defense. But note
that such defense is needed as the claim ranges over all agents, including
human ones. Murphy briefly surveys Hobbesian, Humean, Aristotelian
and Kantian attempts to bridge the argumentative gap. We can ask both
whether these arguments succeed in establishing that familiar welfareoriented goodness governs human beings and, if so, whether they do so
in a way that extends to the Anselmian Being. Murphy is focused on the
second of these questions, but the first deserves some attention.
I do not think that the Hobbesian or Humean strategies succeed in the
former task, so I will set them aside. The Aristotelian approach probably
has the best chance of yielding the conclusion Murphy endorses about the
difference between our ethics and God’s; it might deserve more detailed
development. My worry emerges in consideration of the Kantian argument. Murphy interprets the Kantian as claiming that there are no relevant, non-arbitrary differences among rational agents such that we could
value ourselves, taking our own ends to be reason-giving, yet fail to value
others. His response is that there are very important differences between
human agents and the Anselmian Being. The latter is perfect and not just
“one person among others.” But the best version of the Kantian argument
has it that valuing ourselves qua rational agent is entailed by the activities of choice and action, and these also fix the description under which
we must value ourselves. If this strategy works, then it isn’t clear why the
admittedly vast differences between our agency and perfect divine agency
would make the kind of difference that Murphy suggests. So long as we
both choose and act—and this does not seem to be something that Murphy wants to deny—the Kantian conclusion will apply to us both.
The content of this conclusion is another matter. In 3.4 Murphy argues
that even having established that creaturely well-being grounds reasons,
we must still ask what these reasons are. They are not necessarily reasons
to promote, but perhaps only to respect, well-being, and might be merely
justifying rather than requiring. But why treat these questions as arising
only with respect to the Anselmian Being’s ethics, ignoring the human
case? Above I suggested that Kantians will endorse conclusions about
human ethics similar to those Murphy ascribes to the Anselmian Being.
The normative upshots of the other three strategies with respect to human
ethics deserve further consideration as well.
Murphy’s arguments toward the end of the book provide further reason to suspect greater similarity between human and divine ethics than
he suggests. Concerned to demonstrate the possible existence of the God
of the Abrahamic scriptures, he looks for models on which it would be
sensible to trust an authority not motivated by familiar welfare-oriented
goodness. But the models that he presents are possible human political
authorities. The power of these models does not depend on anything

Faith and Philosophy

150

distinctive of divine agency. If convincing, they show that we could have
reason to ally ourselves with, even subordinate our wills to, other human
persons who do not subscribe to familiar welfare-oriented goodness.
Moreover, his culminating case that his view outdoes competitors in
accounting for the central Christian orthodoxy that God loves us, though
God doesn’t have to would be more persuasive if tied to familiar models
of human love. I think that this route is open to him. In my view, just as
human ethics is probably more like the divine ethics that Murphy defends,
so ideals of human love share more with his conception of divine love.
Alongside analogs to political authority, Murphy might have considered
comparisons with models of parental love.
To put my central point in a friendlier way, Murphy has more resources
than he uses to display the possibility of a compelling God—worthy of
worship, allegiance and even love—who nevertheless departs from familiar welfare-oriented goodness. Murphy’s God can seem an unpleasant
character, who demands obedience in a way that looks arbitrary, or uses a
superior position to extract allegiance through a kind of bribery. Murphy
works to tamp down this impression, rightly emphasizing appealing aspects of God’s character that the view accommodates and makes salient.
But there is more that he can say along these lines, and the closer that we
can come to understanding God as sharing, rather than departing from,
motivations we recognize as good in human beings, the less trouble this
sort worry will cause.
I have focused on just one of many possible lines of response to
Murphy’s rich and intricate argument. Like any good philosophical work,
God’s Own Ethics raises many questions even as it provides important insights. The book is a true achievement worthy of careful study and much
discussion.

Exemplarist Moral Theory, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 288. $57.35 (hardcover).
RICHARD KIM, Loyola University Chicago
In every area of philosophy, novel theories are rare. In normative ethics,
for instance, the theoretical terrain seems well mapped out by deontology,
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. While fine-tuning and adjustments of
each theory continue, it is not easy to find a theory of morality that doesn’t
fall within these three categories. For this reason alone Linda Zagzebski’s
proposal of a new moral theory, “exemplarist moral theory” (EMT), is an
extraordinary achievement. (Note: in earlier works she takes exemplarism
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